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 1 
Summary 
This essay examines the responsibilities of the Member States in the 
European Union under the Dublin II Regulation from a fundamental rights 
perspective. The examination focuses in particular on two main obligations 
of the Member States – the obligation to assess other Member States’ 
compliance with fundamental rights and the obligation for all Member 
States to respect fundamental rights in the Union. 
 
Member States have previously been permitted to presume that all Member 
States of the Union are safe countries for third-country nationals. However, 
reality shows that grave deficits might exist in the responsible Member 
State’s asylum- and reception system. Both the ECtHR and the CJEU have 
acknowledged in the cases of M.S.S. and N.S. respectively that the use of a 
conclusive presumption therefore could expose asylum seekers to treatment 
contrary to fundamental rights in transfer situations. At present, the lack of 
subsequent judgement from the CJEU nevertheless limits the transferring 
Member State’s obligation to assess the responsible Member State’s 
compliance with fundamental rights to the duty of assessing the compliance 
with the prohibition of torture and inhuman treatment according to Article 4 
in the Charter. 
 
It is currently difficult to establish how fundamental rights in the Charter 
specifically relevant for asylum seeker impact the responsibilities of the 
Member States under the Dublin II Regulation. The question whether 
Member States’ actions fall within the scope of the Charter appears to be an 
imminent issue. The absence of preliminary rulings from the CJEU on the 
interpretation of the scope and meaning of the rights is noticeable. This 
primarily applies to rights without corresponding provisions in the ECHR. 
Since the status of the case law from the ECtHR seems to be in dispute, the 
scope and meaning of corresponding rights may thus not be established for 
certain without further guidance from the CJEU.   Notwithstanding the 
responsibilities of the Member States with regard to the two main 
obligations today, there is reason to expect that the future accession of the 
Union to the ECHR will enhance Member States’ responsibilities in general.  
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Sammanfattning 
I denna uppsats undersöks hur grundläggande rättigheter inom EU påverkar 
medlemsstaternas ansvar vid tillämpning av Dublinförordningen. Uppsatsen 
inriktas på två huvudsakliga skyldigheter hos medlemsstaterna – 
skyldigheten att bedöma andra medlemsstaters skydd av grundläggande 
rättigheter och skyldigheten för alla medlemsstater att respektera de 
grundläggande rättigheterna inom unionen. 
 
Medlemsstaterna har tidigare, mot bakgrund av syftet med 
Dublinförordningen, tillåtits att presumera att alla medlemsstater inom EU 
är säkra för tredjelandsmedborgare vid tillämpningen av reglerna i 
förordningen. Verkligheten har dock visat att det kan finnas allvarliga 
brister i medlemsstaters asyl- och mottagningssystem. Både 
Europadomstolen och EU-domstolen har i M.S.S. respektive N.S.-målet 
uppmärksammat att en sådan icke motbevisbar presumption därför riskerar 
att utsätta asylsökande för brott mot grundläggande rättigheter vid 
överföring till den ansvariga medlemsstaten. Avsaknaden av ytterligare 
avgöranden från EU-domstolen gör dock att skyldigheten för överförande 
medlemsstater att kontrollera huruvida den ansvariga medlemsstaten 
upprätthåller skyddet för grundläggande rättigheter enligt EU-rätten än så 
länge är begränsad till att undersöka upprätthållandet av förbudet mot tortyr 
och omänsklig behandling enligt Artikel 4 i EU-stadgan. 
 
Det är i nuläget svårt att urskilja hur grundläggande rättigheter i EU-stadgan 
som särskilt berör asylsökande påverkar medlemsstaters ansvar vid 
tillämpning av Dublinförordningen. Frågan om medlemsstaternas 
handlingar faller inom ramen för EU-stadgans tillämpningsområde framstår 
som ett övergripande problem. Bristen på förhandsavgöranden från EU-
domstolen om hur innebörden och räckvidden av rättigheterna ska tolkas är 
anmärkningsvärd. Detta gäller i första hand de rättigheter i EU-stadgan som 
inte anses korrespondera till rättigheter i Europakonventionen om mänskliga 
rättigheter. Eftersom det råder osäkerhet i frågan om praxis från 
Europadomstolen är bindande, kan dessutom innebörden och räckvidden av 
korresponderande rättigheter inte med säkerhet fastställas utan en mer 
omfattande vägledning från EU-domstolen. Oavsett hur ansvaret för 
medlemsstaterna i nuläget ser ut enligt de två huvudsakliga skyldigheterna 
finns det anledning att anta att medlemsstaternas ansvar generellt kan 
komma att öka i och med EU:s framtida anslutning till Europakonventionen 
om mänskliga rättigheter. 
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Abbreviations 
AG Advocate General 
CEAS Common European Asylum System 
CAT United Nations Convention against Torture  
Charter Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 
CJEU Court of Justice of the European Union 
ECHR European Convention on Human Rights 
ECtHR European Court of Human Rights 
ICCPR United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights 
LTTE Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam 
TEU Treaty on European Union 
TFEU Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
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1 Introduction  
1.1 Purpose and objective 
The purpose of this essay is to examine the responsibilities of the Member 
States in the European Union from a fundamental rights perspective in 
relation to the Dublin II Regulation. This purpose encompasses the review 
of two main obligations – the obligation for Member States to assess other 
Member States’ compliance with fundamental rights and the obligation for 
all Member States to respect fundamental rights as protected in the Union. 
As will be seen, these two obligations resemble each other and they overlap 
to a certain degree. Whereas the first one addresses the more comprehensive 
issue of presuming that transfers of asylum seekers between Member States 
on the basis of the regulation will not be in conflict with fundamental rights 
of individuals, the latter one deals more with the potential impact of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (Charter) on Member 
States’ responsibilities.  
 
1.2 Method and material 
The question on Member States’ responsibilities under the Dublin II 
Regulation from a fundamental rights perspective is approached with a legal 
dogmatic method. The relevant law will first be identified and subsequently 
discussed with references to case law from the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (CJEU) and the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR), preparatory- and explanatory work on relevant primary and 
secondary legislation as well as arguments submitted by authors in the 
academic literature. Sections concerning issues of Union law, particularly 
difficult from a legal point of view, will be supported by the work of 
scholars to a large extent, such as the final section on the accession of the 
Union to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). 
 
1.3  Limitations 
In the following, discussions are limited to fundamental rights issues 
originating from recent decisions of the CJEU concerning the cooperation 
between Member States under Dublin II Regulation. The selection of rights 
in the Charter is based on rights the Court previously been requested to 
interpret as well as pending cases before the Court. Even though it would 
not be possible here to exhaustively examining the rights in the Charter, the 
intention is to address rights likely to be affected by Member States’ 
application of the provision in the Dublin II Regulation. Since the Charter 
quite recently became legally binding, issues surrounding the scope of 
application and rules of interpretation will be discussed in more general 
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terms and not strictly in relation to the regulation. The same applies to the 
final section on the future accession of the Union to the ECHR. 
 
1.4 Outline 
The first chapter will provide for a general overview of the Dublin II 
Regulation. This includes a description of the legal base and the scope of 
application, the motives behind the regulation and the procedure of deciding 
the responsible Member State for examining an asylum application lodged 
in the Union. Chapter 3 is devoted to the concept of ‘presumption of safe 
countries’ as it has evolved in relation to transfers of asylum seekers 
between the Member States within the Union and to states outside the 
Union. The well-known judgements of N.S. v. Secretary of State for Home 
Department and M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, delivered by the CJEU and 
the ECtHR respectively, will be of main importance. Finally, Chapter 4 will 
turn to the Charter. This chapter begins with the issue on the scope of 
application of the Charter and the rules of interpretation of the articles in the 
Charter. Secondly, rights specifically relevant for asylum seekers under the 
application of the regulation will be examined. This includes the prohibition 
of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment in Article 4, the right to an 
effective remedy in Article 47, the right to asylum in Article 18 and the 
principle of the child’s best interest in Article 24 in the Charter. Article 
52(3) in the Charter requires the interpretation of some of these rights to be 
guided by the scope and meaning of corresponding rights in the ECHR. 
Therefore, the final sections will address the consequences of Article 52(3) 
and briefly examining the status of the ECHR and the future accession of 
the Union to the ECHR. Against this background, the responsibilities of 
Member States under the Dublin II Regulation from a fundamental rights 
perspective, will hopefully be reflected in an interesting way. 
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2 Dublin II Regulation  
2.1  Legal base and scope of application 
The Dublin II Regulation
1
 is currently part of the Union’s legislative 
framework for “policies on border checks, asylum and immigration”.2 With 
the purpose of creating a “common policy on asylum” and in the long run a 
Common European Asylum System (CEAS), Member States of the Union 
have been, and remain, obliged to adopt certain legislative measures on 
different issues relating to the treatment of asylum seekers and the 
procedures for processing asylum claims.
3
 The establishment of a CEAS 
began in the 1990s when the Member States decided to harmonise their 
national asylum legislation in order to ensure that asylum seekers and other 
vulnerable persons would be offered equal protection in the Union and to 
ensure that the level of protection would correspond to fundamental right 
obligations in international and European law, especially the prohibition of 
non-refoulement.
 4
 In Article 78 paragraph 2(e) Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union (TFEU), this duty of adopting asylum legislation 
specifically covers the adoption of “criteria and mechanisms for determining 
which Member State is responsible for considering an application for 
asylum or subsidiary protection”. As Article 1 of the regulation implies, the 
Dublin II Regulation is a direct result of this obligation.
5
 Additionally, many 
other secondary measures on asylum have been adopted on the basis of the 
same article in TFEU. Some of the most important directives are the 
directive on minimum standards for the qualification and status of third-
country nationals, the directive on minimum standards on procedures in 
Member States for granting and withdrawing refugee status, and the 
directive laying down minimum standards for the reception of asylum 
seekers.
6
 Together with the Dublin II Regulation, they constitute the main 
legislative acts within the CEAS.
7
 
 
                                                 
1
 Council Regulation (EC) No 343/2003 of 18 February 2003 establishing the criteria and 
mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an asylum 
application lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national. 
2
 Articles 77 and 78 TFEU. 
3
 Article 78 TFEU; Pieter Boeles and others, “European Migration Law”, 2009 Intersentia, 
Antwerp, 2009, pp. 318-319 (P. Boeles). 
4
 See Presidency Conclusions of the Tampere European Council 15 & 16 October 1999 Nr: 
200/1/99, para 13-17; Francesca Ippolito and Samantha Velluti, “The Recast Process of the 
EU Asylum System: A Balancing Act Between Efficiency and Fairness", Refugee Survey 
Quarterly, Vol. 30, No. 3, 2011, pp. 32-33. 
5
 The former Dublin Convention OJ C 254, 19.8.1997 was replaced by the Dublin II 
Regulation. See in this regard Steve Peers and Nicola Rogers (eds.), “EU Immigration and 
Asylum Law: Text and Commentary”, Matinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden, Boston, (2006), 
pp. 221-222 (S. Peers and N. Rogers).  
6
 Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004, Council Directive 2005/85/EC of 1 
December 2005 and Council Directive 2003/9/EC of 27 January 2003. 
7
 P. Boeles pp. 321-322. See also http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-
do/policies/asylum/index_en.htm. 
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The Dublin II Regulation addresses the issue of determining which of the 
Member States is responsible for conduction the examination of “an 
application for asylum lodged in one of the Member States by a third-
country national”.8 This is a pre-step to the actual examination of the 
grounds for seeking asylum. It is important to emphasise that the 
harmonisation of Member States’ national asylum laws through the 
implementation of these directives have a significant impact from a 
fundamental rights perspective since they intend to ensure that individuals 
are subjected to sufficient treatment and entitled to procedural guarantees 
during the asylum examination.
9
 Even though the regulation is of main 
interest here, cases such as M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece shows that 
transfers of asylum seekers on the basis of the regulation could expose an 
asylum seeker to treatment contrary to international human rights standards 
when Member States fail to fulfil their obligations under these directives.
10
 
 
2.2 Deciding the responsible Member 
State 
The fundamental purpose of the articles in the Dublin II Regulation is to 
establish procedures for two separate situations; the appointment of a 
responsible Member State for conducting an examination of a request for 
asylum and the potential transfer of an asylum seeker to the responsible 
Member State.
11
 As soon as an application for asylum is submitted in one of 
the Member States, the responsibility of handling the application will be 
decided on the basis of specific criteria in Articles 6-14 of the regulation.
12
 
These articles show that certain circumstances, such as if there is one 
Member State that has been more involved in an asylum seeker’s entry to 
the Union or if there already are family members of the asylum seeker 
residing in one of the Member States, will be of major relevance when the 
responsible Member State will be decided.
13
 
 
                                                 
8
 Article 1 Dublin II Regulation. 
9
 Opinion of AG Trstenjak in the case C-411/10 N.S. v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department, delivered on 22 September 2011, para. 89-91 (Opinion in N.S.). See also P. 
Boeles pp. 322-323. 
10
 M.S.S v. Belgium and Greece, Appl. No. 3069/09, judgement of the 21 January 2011 
(M.S.S.).  
11
 S. Peers and N. Rogers p. 222 where the terms “take charge” and “take back” are used. 
12
 Articles 3 and 5(1) Dublin II Regulation. For example, applications from unaccompanied 
minors is regulated in Article 6, asylum seekers with a family member who is either 
residing as a refugee or waiting for a decision in one of the Member States in Articles 7 and 
8, asylum seekers with a residence permit and or a visa in Article 9 and asylum seekers that 
have irregularly crossed the borders of the Union from a non-EU country in Article 10. See 
also S. Peers and N. Rogers pp. 222-223. 
13
 Recitals 6 and 7 Dublin II Regulation; Explanatory memorandum to the Commission’s 
proposal for the Dublin II Regulation COM(2001) 447 final, pp. 4-5 (Explanatory 
Memorandum); Eveline Brouwer, “Mutual Trust and the Dublin Regulation: Protection of 
Fundamental Rights in the EU and the Burden of Proof”, Utrecht Law Review, Vol. 9, No. 
1,  2013, p. 138 (E. Brouwer). 
 8 
With reference to the upcoming discussions of fundamental rights protection 
guaranteed in the Charter and recent jurisprudence from the CJEU and the 
ECtHR concerning rights of asylum seekers in the context of Dublin 
transfers, it is necessary to explain how the responsibility to examine 
asylum applications of unaccompanied minors and asylum seekers who 
enters the Union without permission to do so is distributed. According to 
Article 2(h) in the regulation, ‘unaccompanied minors’ covers “unmarried 
persons below the age of eighteen who arrive in the territory of the Member 
States unaccompanied by an adult responsible for them whether by law or 
by custom, and for as long as they are not effectively taken into care of such 
a person; it includes minors who are left unaccompanied after they have 
entered the territory of the Member States”. Article 6 in the regulation 
currently provides for two different solutions when it comes to these 
applicants. In the first place, if it is “in the best interest” of the child and if 
the unaccompanied minor has a family member who is entitled to reside in 
one of the Member States, that Member State will be given the task of 
processing the application.
14
  Secondly, when an unaccompanied minor do 
not have a family member in the Union, the asylum application should 
instead be examined by the Member State, which received the application.
15
 
In the following chapter, the issue of the best interests of the minor under 
the Dublin II Regulation will be discussed with regard to the case of MA 
and others v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, pending before 
the CJEU
16
. In the case of asylum seekers who have illegally travelled from 
a country outside the Union, the responsible Member State can also be 
appointed in two different ways.  The main rule in Article 10(1) simply 
establishes that the application for asylum shall be examined where the 
asylum seeker first entered the Union. However, if the rule in paragraph 1 
becomes inapplicable or when a certain period of time has passed, the 
obligation to handle the asylum procedure shall be given to the Member 
State in which the asylum seeker lately has been present, given that the 
period of residence in that Member State was without interruption.
17
  
 
Once a Member State receives an asylum application and identifies another 
Member State as responsible on the basis of the criteria above, it has the 
possibility to request the other Member State to take over the procedure of 
examining the asylum application.
18
 If the other Member State agrees to 
take over the responsibility, the asylum seeker will accordingly be 
transferred to the latter Member State.
19
 Transfers may also occur for 
example when an asylum seeker unlawfully resides in another Member State 
                                                 
14
 Article 6 Dublin II Regulation. 
15
 Article 6 Dublin II Regulation. See also S. Peers and N. Rogers p. 222. 
16
 Reference for a preliminary ruling from Court of Appeal (England & Wales) (Civil 
Division) (United Kingdom) made on 19 December 2011 - MA, BT, DA v Secretary of State 
for the Home Department, case C-648/11.  
17
 Article 10(2) Dublin II Regulation; S. Peers and N. Rogers p. 223. 
18
 Article 17 Dublin II Regulation. 
19
 Articles 16, 18, and 19 Dublin II Regulation. 
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than the responsible one during the asylum examination or after his or her 
application has been refused.
20
  
 
2.3 Exceptions to the criteria 
Regardless of the criteria in Articles 6-14, Member States are allowed to 
apply exceptions to these main rules. The exceptions are found in Articles 
3(2) and 15, and they are referred to as the ‘sovereignty- and humanitarian’ 
clauses. 
 
The sovereignty clause in Article 3(2) permits Member States to process a 
received application for asylum despite the fact that another Member State 
should be responsible according to one of the other articles in the 
regulation.
21
 By using this option, the Member State accepts the obligations 
imposed on the responsible Member State in its entirety, including the 
obligation to complete the asylum examination.
22
 As can be seen in the 
preparatory work to the regulation, the European Commission wanted to 
offer Member States an opportunity to take account of “political, 
humanitarian or practical considerations” once the responsible Member 
State will be decided.
23
 Other than that, no further guidelines were originally 
presented.
 
While subsequent reports show that it may be relevant to use the 
article for “humanitarian reasons”, the attempt to narrow down the situations 
where Member States assumingly will take recourse to Article 3(2) is 
apparently difficult due to the fact that the practical application at national 
level is incoherent.
24
 It has for example been applied in situations where the 
sending Member State is uncertain whether a transfer of an asylum seeker 
would be contrary to the prohibition of torture and inhuman treatment or 
whether it would prevent family members from living together.
25
 The risk of 
‘indirect refoulement’ is also listed as one of the factors for considering the 
discretionary power under Article 3(2).
26
 Some general guidelines on how to 
interpret Article 3(2) can be found in the CJEU’s reply in the case of N.S. 
and others v. Secretary State of Home Department in which the Court dealt 
with different aspects of Article 3(2).
27
 Article 3(2) was for example 
discussed in relation to the standards of protection and procedural 
                                                 
20
 See S. Peers and N. Rogers pp. 223-224, referring to Articles 4(5) and 20 Dublin II 
Regulation.  
21
 See examples of other rules in n. 12 above. 
22
 Articles 3(2) and 16 Dublin II Regulation. See also Explanatory Memorandum p. 10. 
23
 Explanatory Memorandum p. 10. See also S. Peers and N. Rogers p. 231.  
24
 Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the 
Evaluation of the Dublin System COM(2007) 299 final, pp. 6-7; further noticed by A. 
Hurwitz p. 105; P. Boeles pp. 325-326. 
25
 Commission Staff Working Document annexed to the Report from the Commission to 
the European Parliament and the Council on the evaluation of the Dublin system 
SEC(2007) 742 final, p. 21 (Commission Staff Working Document). 
26
 Ibid. The term ‘indirect refoulement’ will be explained later on. 
27
 Joined cases C-411/10 N.S. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department and C-493/10 
M.E. v. Refugee Applications Commissioner, Minister of Justice, Equality and Law Reform, 
judgement of the 21 December 2011 (N.S.), see questions for referral in para. 50.  
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guarantees in the Member State to which asylum seekers were to be 
transferred. The following chapters will discuss N.S., including Article 3(2), 
in more detail. 
 
The humanitarian clause in Article 15 in the regulation offers in the same 
way as the sovereignty clause an opportunity for Member States to derogate 
from the rules in Articles 6-14 of the regulation. At the request of a Member 
State, another Member State may take over the responsibility in order to 
keep members of the same family and relatives together when the 
application of the main rules otherwise would separate them.
28
 Article 15(2) 
and (3) of the article specifically relate to individuals who for reasons such 
as pregnancy or grave illness rely on the assistance of a relative, and 
unaccompanied minors who have the possibility to be brought up by family 
members present in the Union. Article 15 seems, for example, to be 
associated with similar concerns for the right to respect for private and 
family life under Article 8 ECHR.
29
  
 
A similarity between these two exceptions is that the wording of the articles 
invite to discussions regarding their content and scope of application. The 
CJEU answered questions on the interpretation of Article 15 in a 
preliminary ruling in the end of 2012.
30
 In the case, Austria requested 
Poland to take charge of an asylum application in accordance with the 
criteria in the regulation. Present circumstances led the national courts in 
Austria to ask the CJEU whether humanitarian considerations could render 
the application of Article 15 mandatory for Austria when there is a “[…] 
daughter-in-law of the asylum seeker [who] is dependent on the asylum 
seeker’s assistance because that daughter-in-law has a new-born baby and 
suffers from a serious illness and handicap”.31 This question was answered 
in the affirmative within the meaning of Article 15(2) and the Court further 
held it unnecessary to make the application of paragraph 2 dependent on the 
request of the Member State otherwise responsible under the criteria. For 
reasons of effectiveness, the Court concluded that once the requirements in 
the article are fulfilled and the family members already reside together, the 
requirement of a request from the other Member State would only make the 
process of deciding the responsible Member State more extended.
32
 
 
2.4 Motives behind the regulation 
It follows from the preamble to the Dublin II Regulation as well as other 
preparatory documents that the regulation encompasses several objectives.
33
 
                                                 
28
 Article 15(1) Dublin II Regulation; Explanatory Memorandum p. 15. 
29
 Commission Staff Working Document p. 22. See also P. Boeles p. 326.  
30
 C-245/11 K v. Bundesasylamt, judgement of the 6 November 2012 (K). 
31
 K para. 26. 
32
 Ibid. para. 47-54. 
33
 For example Recitals 2, 3, and 4 Dublin II Regulation; Explanatory Memorandum p. 3. 
See also K. Hailbronner, “EU Immigration and Asylum Law: Commentary on EU 
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In this section, selected motives behind the regulation will shortly be 
presented, which suggestively should be seen in the light of Article 3 in the 
regulation. Article 3 establishes that Member States actually have an 
obligation to take charge of asylum applications and that only one Member 
State shall finally be given the task of doing so on the basis of the criteria in 
the regulation.  
 
Initiatives to the adoption of the Dublin II Regulation started once it was 
recognised that there was a need to create a “clear and workable method for 
determining the Member State responsible”. 34 It was also recognised that 
the regulation should “make it possible to determine rapidly the Member 
State responsible, so as to guarantee effective access to the procedures for 
determining refugee status and not to compromise the objective of the rapid 
processing of asylum applications”.35 Apart from assisting Member States in 
their cooperation, it was thus of importance to ensure that individuals who 
are seeking protection get their protective status decided quickly and 
effectively.
36
 In addition to this primary purpose of rapidly deciding which 
Member States should be responsible, the regulation is further intended to 
reduce certain situations that can arise in the context of asylum applications. 
Among them, preventing the issues of ‘asylum-shopping’ and ‘refugee in 
orbit’ appear to be most relevant.37 The term asylum-shopping refers to the 
situation where asylum seekers apply for protection in more than one 
Member State, whereas refugee in orbit means that no Member State 
recognises the obligation of examining a request for protection.
38
 These 
situations conflicts with the rules in Article 3 of the regulation and they are   
problematic both from the perspective of the Member States and individual 
asylum seekers. It is important to emphasise that the Dublin II Regulation is 
intended to guarantee the fulfilment of all these motives at the same time. 
Without questioning the purpose behind each one of the motives, the case 
law from the CJEU in the following will illustrate that these objectives may 
have an impact on how the Court interprets the articles in the regulation.  
Preliminary rulings from the Court further indicate that the application of 
the criteria in the regulation can give rise to situations where it might be 
difficult to enforce these objectives and individual fundamental rights 
simultaneously.   
                                                                                                                            
Regulations and Directives”, Beck, München, 2010, pp. 1375-1382 (K. Hailbronner), 
where he gives a clear overview of important objectives of the regulation. 
34
 Recital 3 Dublin II Regulation: Explanatory Memorandum p. 3.  
35
 Recital 4 Dublin II Regulation; Explanatory Memorandum p. 3.  
36
 Recital 4 Dublin II Regulation; Opinion in N.S. para 93. 
37
 K. Hailbronner pp. 1375-1382; P. Boeles p. 324; Angès Hurwitz, “The Collective 
Responsibility of States to Protect Refugees”, Oxford University Press Inc., New York 
2009, p. 91 (A. Hurwitz). 
38
 P. Boeles p. 324. 
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3 The obligation to assess other 
Member States’ compliance with 
fundamental rights 
The previous chapter served the purpose of introducing and explaining the 
function of the Dublin II Regulation, namely to provide the Member States 
with rules on how to distribute the responsibility of examining asylum 
applications in the Union. With regard to following chapters, the previous 
chapter highlighted in particular those principles and provisions that have 
been subjected to preliminary rulings by the CJEU and discussions by 
scholars in the academic literature. Whereas chapter 4 more closely explore 
the scope and content of articles in the Charter, this chapter deals with the 
‘presumption of safe countries’ Even though Member States sometimes fail 
to comply with fundamental rights obligations, the Dublin II Regulation 
rests upon the presumption that all Member States are safe for third-country 
nationals and that they all respect the principle of non-refoulement.
39
 
 
3.1 The Geneva Convention relating to the 
status of refugees and the principle of 
non-refoulement  
The principle of non-refoulement is often referred to as the foundation of 
asylum law.
40
 It is therefore appropriate to describe the principle before 
examining the presumption of safe countries under the Dublin II Regulation. 
As stated in Article 33(1) of the 1951 Geneva Convention relating to the 
status of refugees, state parties to the Convention are prevented from 
sending a refugee to a country where he or she may be exposed to a risk of 
life threatening treatment due to reasons such as religion or membership of a 
political group.
41
 The regulation itself those not have a provision explicitly 
prohibiting refoulement, but the obligation nevertheless exists in other 
sources of international law.
42
  Among the rights relating to refugees in the 
Convention, the principle of non-refoulement is the most central one with 
regard to European asylum law. Article 78 TFEU requires for example the 
                                                 
39
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40
 See for example P. Boeles pp. 253 and 261. 
41
 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 28 July 1951 and Protocol Relating to 
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42
 For an overview of these sources, see Julia Mink, “EU Asylum Law and Human Rights 
Protection: Revisiting the Principle of Non-refoulement and the Prohibition of Torture and 
Other Forms of Ill-treatment”, European Journal of Migration and Law, Vol. 14, No. 2, 
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Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and Article 3 ECHR. 
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Union to take full account of the principle in the development of a uniform 
asylum policy and in the adoption of secondary legislation within the 
CEAS.
43
  There are also other significant aspects of the Geneva Convention 
relating to the status of refugees. It is for example relevant to observe that an 
individual may only rely on the prohibition of refoulement in the 
Convention if the individual in question is an asylum seeker or can be 
regarded as a refugee within the meaning of Article 1A(2) of the 
Convention.
44
 The status of a refugee applies to someone who “[…] owing 
to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is 
outside the country of his nationality, and is unable or, owing to such fear, is 
unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not 
having a nationality and being outside the country of his formal habitual 
residence, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it”.45  
This definition of a refugee is referred to in the CEAS directives on asylum 
mentioned above as well as in the Dublin II Regulation.
46
  
 
The objective here is not to further explore the requirements in the definition 
of refugees. However, the protection in Articles 33(1) and 1A(2) in the 
Geneva Convention relating to the status of refugees also applies in cases of 
indirect refoulement.
47
 As been stated by the ECtHR, the prohibition of 
indirect refoulement implies that when a state decides to send an asylum 
seeker to another state, the first state must ensure that the latter one will not 
return the individual to a location where the asylum seeker would face a real 
risk of ill-treatment.
48
  
 
3.2 The presumption of safe countries in 
the regulation 
It is necessary to stress that the presumption of safe countries in this essay is 
linked to the determination of a responsible Member State and to the 
moment when a Member State of the Union decides to transfer an asylum 
seeker to the responsible Member State. It is not linked to the responsible 
Member State’s process of delivering a substantive decision of granting or 
withdrawing refugee status in which asylum standards and practices in other 
states also may be of concern.
49
 In other words, this section focuses on the 
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fact the that Member States may theoretically transfer an asylum seeker 
without questioning whether the national standards of procedures and 
treatment in the responsible Member State are in conformity with 
fundamental rights.
50
 
 
Recital 2 in the Dublin II Regulation states that “[…] the European Council, 
at its special meeting in Tampere on 15 and 16 October 1999, agreed to 
work towards establishing a Common European Asylum System, based on 
the full and inclusive application of the Geneva Convention relating to the 
Status of Refugees […], thus ensuring that nobody is sent back to 
persecution, i.e. maintaining the principle of non-refoulement. In this 
respect, and without affecting the responsibility criteria laid down in this 
Regulation, Member States, all respecting the principle of non-refoulement, 
are considered as safe countries for third-country nationals”.  
 
Simply the wording of Recital 2 reveals that there are two main reasons for 
creating such a presumption of safety. First of all, Member States of the 
Union are bound by the prohibition of non-refoulement in Article 33(1) 
Geneva Convention relating to the status of refugees. Secondly, the 
directives of the CEAS are progressively ensuring that national rules on 
reception conditions and asylum procedures offer asylum seekers adequate 
treatment.
51
 Other sources of fundamental rights preferably provides for 
additional reasons. Brouwer refers for example to the prohibitions against 
torture and ill-treatment in Article 4 of the Charter and in Article 3 in the 
ECHR and to the right to an effective remedy in Article 13 of the ECHR as 
further support for a such a presumption in the context of refugee 
protection.
52
 Advocate General (AG) Trstenjak explains that the Dublin II 
Regulation operates within a network of binding fundamental rights 
obligations and harmonising directives, which makes it legally legitimate to 
leave out a provision in the regulation obliging the sending Member State to 
investigate the conditions for asylum seekers in the responsible Member 
State.
53
 By reference to the Court in N.S., the trust between Member States 
was essentially a prerequisite for the adoption of the CEAS, including the 
regulation, in the first place.
54
 Without a presumption of safety, it seemed 
unlikely for the Union to fulfil the objectives of improving the effectiveness 
and legal consistency in the system of receiving asylum applications and 
distributing the responsibility for taking charge of the applications.
55
 
 
                                                 
50
 E. Brouwer p. 138.  
51
 Ibid. 
52
 E. Brouwer, pp. 138-139, where she refers, inter alia, to Hemme Battje in “Mutual Trust 
in Asylum Matters: the Dublin System”, in Hemme Battje and others, “The principle of 
Mutual Trust in European Asylum, Migrations and Criminal Law – Reconciling Trust and 
Fundamental Rights Utrecht”, FORUM, Institute for Multicultural affairs, 2011, Utrecht, 
the Netherlands, p. 10.  In addition to references made in n. 51 and n. 52 above, see Violeta 
Moreno-Lax, Dismantling the Dublin System: M.S.S. v, Belgium and Greece, European 
Journal of Migration and Law, Vol. 14, No. 1, 2012, pp. 1-31, pp. 4-5 (V. Moreno-Lax).  
53
 Opinion in N.S. para. 96. 
54
 N.S. para. 75-80. 
55
 Ibid. 
 15 
Even though the legal reasons for upholding such a presumption of 
compliance with minimum standards and fundamental rights are convincing, 
there are few guidelines on how to approach the presumption in practice. As 
Moreno-Law points out, there are no indications within the Dublin II 
Regulation on whether the presumption could or should be proven to be 
false in some cases.
56
  
 
 The presumption of safe countries within 3.2.1
the ECtHR 
 
3.2.1.1 Early developments in the cases of T.I v. the 
United Kingdom and K.R.S. v. the United 
Kingdom 
The purpose of section 3.3 and 3.4 is to study how the practical application 
of the presumption of safe countries has evolved throughout the case law of 
the ECtHR and the CJEU. Judgements described in the following 
subsections of 3.3 and 3.4 may also serve as background knowledge for 
chapter 4.   
 
Within the framework of the ECHR, descriptions and comments on the 
issue of a presumption of safety under the Dublin II Regulation often begin 
with a presentation of the case of T.I. v. the United Kingdom and the case of 
K.R.S. v. the United Kingdom.
57
 In T.I., the applicant originally resided in a 
Sri Lankan region under the control of the hostile organisation Liberation 
Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). On several occasions, he was captivated in 
order to give the organisation technical support. Once he managed to escape 
he was believed to be a member of the LTTE and was for this reason 
harassed by the Sri Lankan army, police force and the Eelam National 
Democratic Liberation Front.
58
 T.I. managed to get to Germany where he 
applied for asylum. The German authorities refused his application, mainly 
referring to the fact that they could not consider the suggested assaults as 
actions committed by the Sri Lankan state. Moreover, the Sri Lanka 
Government had ratified the United Nations Convention against Torture and 
the German authorities could not find grounds for assuming that the Sri 
Lankan army and police force would suspect T.I. of being a member of the 
LTTE. With regard to German law and Article 3 ECHR, T.I. was therefore 
not believed to be in danger if he was sent back to southern parts of Sri 
                                                 
56
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Lanka.
59
 T.I. finally left for the United Kingdom and lodged an asylum 
application there. Due to his prior arrival in Germany, the task of examining 
his asylum application was upon the request of the United Kingdom given 
to the German authorities.
60
 Supported by the previous events, the applicant 
claimed that the decision of the United Kingdom to send him back to 
Germany would result in a removal to Sri Lanka and would consequently 
expose him to the risk of being treated contrary to the prohibition against 
torture and ill-treatment in Article 3 ECHR and deprive him of the right to 
an effective remedy in Article 13 ECHR.
61
   
 
In the main proceedings, the ECtHR recognised that earlier judgements 
established an obligation for states “[…] not to expel a person to a country 
where substantial grounds have been shown for believing that [the 
applicant] would face a real risk of being subjected to treatment contrary to 
Article 3” ECHR regardless of the question whether the state was involved 
in the harassments at all.
62
 In the present case, the potential risk of indirect 
refoulement created the same obligation for the United Kingdom. Even 
though the Court did not find a violation of the articles invoked by the 
applicant, the Court held that the protection of fundamental rights requires 
Contracting States not to “[rely] automatically in that context on the 
arrangements made in the Dublin Convention concerning the attribution of 
responsibility between European countries for deciding asylum claims”.63 
On the basis of these words it is therefore suggested that the previous 
conclusive presumption of safety became open for rebuttal.
64
 Although 
Moreno-Lax believes that the Court failed to explain how the refutability 
works in individual cases, she nevertheless emphasises the importance of 
establishing such a rule in the first place.
65
  
 
K.R.S. concerned an Iranian national who came to the United Kingdom via 
Greece.  The Greek authorities accordingly handled his asylum 
application.
66
 Similar to the situation in T.I., the Court had to consider 
whether the United Kingdom could be violating Articles 3 and 13 in the 
ECHR by transferring the applicant to Greece and therefore expose him to a 
potential risk of being indirectly removed to his country of origin from 
Greece.
67
 In its decision, the Court stated that the general principles 
underlying these articles in the ECHR and the rule established in T.I. were 
applicable to the present case. The Court also paid attention to reports from 
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the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees on the existing 
situation in Greece. In summary, these reports questioned whether 
transferred asylum seekers could get access to judicial remedies in Greece 
as guaranteed by Article 13 ECHR. However, since Greece did not carrying 
out expulsions of individuals to Iran at that time and the fact that Greece 
was under the obligation to respect the CEAS directives on the treatment of 
asylum seekers and procedural guarantees, there were no reasons for 
presuming that Greece would act contrary to these minimum standards.
68
 In 
addition, the Greek authorities had previously ensured to the United 
Kingdom that asylum seekers transferred back to Greece on the basis of the 
criteria in the Dublin II Regulation would have the opportunity to launch an 
appeal against a subsequent expulsion decision if there is a risk of ill-
treatment in the latter state. Greece was therefore presumed to comply with 
its obligations under the ECHR and the Court did not find that the 
authorities in United Kingdom would violate the applicant’s rights under the 
ECHR if they decided to transfer the applicant to Greece.
69
 In comparison to 
T.I, this judgement has been held to re-introducing a somewhat conclusive 
presumption of safety since it has been suggested that the Court relied on 
the arguments originally supporting the creation of a presumption within the 
framework of the Dublin II Regulation.
70
  
 
3.2.1.2 Recent developments in the case of M.S.S. v. 
Belgium and Greece 
The ECtHR’s approach towards its previous statements in cases involving 
obligations for Contracting States applying the rules in the Dublin II 
Regulation and transferring asylum seekers to the responsible Member State 
has become less important due to the Court’s decision in M.S.S. v. Belgium 
and Greece.
71
 Without undermining the condemning of actions committed 
by Greece, there is reason to limit the review of the judgement in this 
chapter to the applicant’s claims against Belgium. As will be seen, the 
presumption of safe countries could not be applied to Greece and Belgium 
consequently failed to comply with the obligation to assess another Member 
State’s compliance with fundamental rights before it carried out a transfer of 
an asylum seeker on account of the criteria in the regulation. The decision to 
transfer the applicant finally amounted to a breach of Article 3 and Article 
13 ECHR since the transfer exposed the applicant to the flaws in the Greek 
asylum system as well as to the possibility of being indirectly removed to 
the risk of ill-treatment in Afghanistan as a result of those flaws.
72
  
 
The applicant in M.S.S. first left Afghanistan and arrived in the Union via 
Greece. He finally reached Belgium where he lodged an asylum 
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application.
73
 Followed by an unanswered request to the Greek authorities to 
process the asylum application on the basis of Article 10 in the Dublin II 
Regulation, Greece became responsible in accordance with Article 18(7) in 
the Dublin II Regulation.
74
 Already in the pre-stages of transfer 
proceedings, the UNHCR advised the Belgium authorities to refrain from 
carrying out the transfer because of the current situation for asylum seekers 
in Greece.
75
 The applicant’s main concerns related to Article 3 ECHR due to 
the risk of “arbitrary detention” and other forms of ill-treatment. He further 
challenged the transfer on grounds relating to the possibility of being 
removed to Afghanistan without having an opportunity to get his asylum 
application scrutinised.
76
 Belgium did however not find any reasons for 
believing that Greece would expose the applicant to treatment contrary to 
their international obligations.
77
 The ECtHR was also under the impression 
that Greece would treat the asylum seeker in a manner consistent with the 
ECHR and informed the Greek authorities that it did not intend to suspend 
the transfer. The applicant was therefore transferred to Greece in the end.
78
  
The subsequent course of events in Greece can be summarised as follows; 
“[…] the applicant was immediately […] placed in detention in a building 
next to the airport, where he was locked up in a small space with 20 other 
detainees, had access to the toilets only at the discretion of the guards, was 
not allowed out into the open air, was given very little to eat and had to 
sleep on a dirty mattress on the bare floor”.79 Once upon release, he had to 
live in a park and there was consequently no way for him to avail himself 
for information from the asylum authorities.
80
 Submitted by the applicant, 
these events amounted to treatment contrary to Article 3 in the ECHR due to 
the fact that the Belgium authorities allegedly was aware of the systematic 
flaws in the Greek asylum system.
81
 
 
Of main importance is how the Court discussed the responsibility of 
Belgium in relation to ECHR for transferring M.S.S. to Greece. Relying on 
the rule established in T.I., the Court formulated the issue at stake as the 
question whether there had been indications, which should have led 
Belgium to consider the presumption of safety in Greece rebutted.
82
 The 
Court put a decisive weight on the fact that Belgium carried out the transfer 
in a time when the insufficient conditions and procedural guarantees for 
asylum seekers in Greece had been recognised.
83
 Besides the information 
surrounding previous judgement from the Court in relation to Greece, 
several international organisations had for example released reports 
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supporting the current complexities for asylum seekers transferred back to 
Greece.
84
 In addition, the European Commission had recently initiated a 
recast process of the existing secondary Union legislation on asylum in 
order to protect fundamental rights of individuals.
85
 Dialogues between the 
governments involved in the transfer were deemed not to have a bearing in 
situations concerning Article 3 in the ECHR.
86
 With regard to the right to an 
effective remedy, the Court did not find Belgium law to be in fully 
compliance with the principles underlying Article 13 ECHR. For example, 
even though there was a possibility to shortly suspend the transfer to 
Greece, the procedure itself failed to comply with the condition of a “close 
and rigorous” review of the “substance” of the asylum application and it 
created an unreasonably burden for the individual to prove the risk of 
violation of Article 3 in the ECHR.
87
  
 
The fact that the Court relied on the availability of information indicating 
the lack of enforcement of fundamental rights in practice has been identified 
as one of the main difference between the Court’s reasoning in M.S.S. and in 
its earlier judgements.
88
 The conclusions reached by the ECtHR in M.S.S. on 
the presumption of safety in relation to the ECHR and Member States’ 
cooperation on the basis of the Dublin II Regulation thus show that the 
authorities in a transferring Member State have a duty to observe how 
asylum seekers actually are treated in the receiving Member State before 
they carry out the transfer.
89
  
 
 The presumption of safe countries within 3.2.2
the CJEU  
The meaning of a presumption of safe countries in relation to transfers of 
asylum seekers under the Dublin II Regulation between Member States of 
the Union has also become a relevant question before the CJEU. In N.S., the 
order to be transferred from the United Kingdom to Greece was disputed by 
the applicant in the national courts. N.S. argued that the flaws in the Greek 
asylum system would obliged the United Kingdom to make use of the 
sovereignty clause in Article 3(2) in the regulation in order to protect him 
from insufficient treatment in Greece.
90
 From the prior proceedings in the 
national courts, the situation in Greece had been described as follows: “(1) 
asylum procedures in Greece are said to have serious shortcomings; 
applicants encounter numerous difficulties in carrying out the necessary 
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formalities; they are not provided with sufficient information and assistance; 
their claims are not examined with due care; (2) the proportion of asylum 
applications which are granted is understood to be extremely low; (3) 
judicial remedies are stated to be inadequate and very difficult to access; (4) 
the conditions for reception of asylum seekers are considered to be 
inadequate: applicants are either detained in inadequate conditions or they 
live outside in destitution, without shelter or food”. 91 Accordingly, the 
Court was asked to answer, inter alia, the questions if a transferring 
Member State has a duty to examine whether fundamental rights in the 
Union and the CEAS legislation are respected in the receiving Member 
State, whether such an obligation would prohibit the transferring Member 
State to completely rely on the assumption that the receiving Member State 
would comply with fundamental rights in the Union and the requirements in 
the CEAS directives, and whether the application of Article 3(2) in the 
regulation becomes mandatory whenever the right to human dignity in 
Article 1, the prohibition of torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment in Article 4, the right to asylum in Article 18, the right to 
protection in the event of removal, expulsion or extradition in Article 19(2) 
and/or the right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial in Article 47 in the 
Charter could be at stake in the receiving Member State.
92
 The primary 
question on whether the Charter was applicable when Member States 
exercise their sovereignty under Article 3(2) in the regulation was answered 
in the affirmative for reasons explained in the next chapter.  
 
By answering the questions referred, the Court primarily elaborated on the 
legal sources supporting a presumption of safety when the rules in the 
Dublin II Regulation are applied. For all the reasons mentioned in the 
previous chapter concerning the motives behind the regulation, the Court 
affirms the reasonableness of allowing Member States to cooperate with 
each other under this premise.
93
 When it came to the issue of assessing the 
presumption of safety in relation to the Charter, the Court therefore 
established that breaches of fundamental rights in the receiving Member 
State would not always prevent the transferring Member State from acting 
in accordance with the criteria in the Dublin II Regulation.
94
 This statement 
can assumingly be applied to at least all of the rights in the Charter invoked 
by the applicant in the main proceeding. Secondly, if all Member States are 
presumed to respect fundamental rights, the Court held that it would not be 
legitimate to refuse them from sending an asylum seeker to the responsible 
Member State when detected flaws in the receiving Member State’s asylum 
system only concern small aspects of the standards imposed by the CEAS 
directives.
95
 According to the Court, suspending transfers due to small 
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breaches of the minimum directives would compromise some of the motives 
behind the regulation. It would for example effectively hinder the purpose of 
preserving of quick method for allocating the responsibility of processing an 
asylum application in the Union.
96
  
 
However, the situation was considered to be different when the standard of 
treatment of asylum seekers in the receiving Member State reaches a more 
serious level. On the basis of the judgement in M.S.S., the Court 
acknowledged that Member States had access to the sources of information 
referred to in M.S.S. and could therefore not consider themselves unaware of 
complications in the Greek asylum system.
97
 Bringing the reasoning into the 
context of refutability, the Court held that the presumption of compliance 
with fundamental rights would be rebutted and the transfer precluded “[…] 
if there are systematic flaws in the asylum procedure and reception 
conditions for asylum applicants in the Member State responsible, resulting 
in inhuman or degrading treatment, within the meaning of Article 4 of the 
Charter”.98 The Court also discussed the consequences from having rebutted 
the presumption of safety and whether there is an obligation to apply Article 
3(2) in the regulation for the purpose of taking charge of the asylum 
application. Provided that the applicant would not take damage from a long 
procedure, the Court held that the transferring Member State should 
continue to assess whether another Member State can be considered 
responsible on account of the other rules in the regulation. There is only an 
obligation to use Article 3(2) in the regulation when the transferring 
Member State deems it “necessary”.99 
 
There are several relevant aspects of this judgement to discuss. Of main 
importance here is to observe that the Court’s answers in N.S. gave rise to 
an obligation, similar to the one established in the case of M.S.S., to assess 
Member States’ compliance with fundamental rights when they apply the 
rules in the Dublin II Regulation. This obligation exists even though there is 
not an automatic obligation to apply Article 3(2) in the regulation in cases 
where Article 4 in the Charter would prevent a transfer. Moreover, there is 
reason to recall some of the comments made under the section on the 
motives behind the regulation. In contrast to the judgements of the ECtHR, 
it seems like the CJEU had to balance the concern for fundamental rights of 
individuals against the need of maintaining the fulfilment of fundamental 
objectives of the regulation. As stated above, the presumption of safe 
countries is one way of facilitating the fulfilment of these objectives. 
Without the purpose of arguing for another outcome than the one reached by 
the Court in N.S., these potential conflicts seem to be of relevance once the 
responsibilities of the Member States under the regulation is decided. 
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4 The obligation to respect 
fundamental rights 
It has now been confirmed both by the CJEU and by the ECtHR that a 
conclusive presumption of compliance is not allowed under the application 
of the Dublin II Regulation when it comes to the transfer of asylum seekers 
to the responsible Member State. While such a presumption is precluded, it 
is interesting to see in more detail what kind of fundamental rights the 
Member States have to respect in the context of the Dublin II Regulation.  
 
The regulation applies between Member States of the Union.
100
 For this 
reason, this examination is limited to the applicability of the Charter on 
Member State actions and to the question on how rights in the Charter 
relevant to asylum seekers should be interpreted. The prohibition of torture 
and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in Article 4, the right to 
an effective remedy in Article 47, the right to asylum in Article 18, and the 
principle of the child´s best interest in Article 24 of the Charter will be 
examined in this regard. The final sections in this chapter will explore 
Article 52(3) in the Charter more deeply and there will be brief comments 
on the status of the ECHR in the Union with respect to the future accession 
of the Unioin to the Convention. 
 
4.1 The Union Charter of Fundamental 
Rights 
As a consequence of the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, the Charter 
is currently binding upon the Member States and the institutions of the 
Union.
101
 Its specific field of application is described in Article 51(1) of the 
Charter, which states that “[the] provisions of this Charter are addressed to 
the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union with due regard to 
the principle of subsidiarity and to the Member States only when they are 
implementing Union law. They shall therefore respect the rights, observe 
the principles and promote the application thereof in accordance with their 
respective powers and respecting the limits of the power of the Union as 
conferred on it in the Treaties”. Opposed to the duties and functions of the 
EU institutions, the application of the provisions in the Dublin II Regulation 
remains relevant for Member States, which is why the binding character of 
the Charter in relation to the Member States will be prioritised here. Hence, 
the determining factor for applicability of the Charter is whether or not they 
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can be considered to be “implementing Union law” when they act on the 
basis of the regulation.
102
 
 
The absence of an explicit definition of ‘implementing Union law’ in the 
article is complemented by guidelines in other sources of interpretation. 
First, the interpretation of the articles in the Charter shall be guided by the 
Explanations annexed to the Charter.
103
 Accordingly, in the explanation on 
Article 51(1) in the Charter it is said, inter alia, that “[…] it follows 
unambiguously from the case-law of the Court of Justice that the 
requirement to respect fundamental rights defined in the context is only 
binding on the Member States when they act in the scope of Union law”.104 
In relation to the interpretation of Article 51, Rosas states that many 
discussions have addressed the question whether the use of different 
terminologies, in the Charter and in the explanation to Article 51(1) 
respectively, effects the range of situations in which Member States are 
bound by fundamental rights obligations.
105
 This implies that the scope of 
application of the Charter is not fully established. Against this background, 
the meaning of implementing Union law should at least be briefly explored 
in order to be able to assess when certain national actions under the Dublin 
II Regulation fall within the scope of the Charter.  
 
From a comprehensive perspective, the binding status of the Charter is not 
believed to dramatically modify the scope of application of fundamental 
rights to actions of the Member States.
106
 The Member States are under the 
obligation to ensure that the rights are protected in fields of law governed by 
the Union.
107
 Other provisions in the Treaty on European Union (TEU) as 
well as the Charter confirm in particular that the Charter does not produce 
wider competences or any new tasks of the Union and that the articles in the 
                                                 
102
 Article 51(1) Charter; Allan Rosas, “When is the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights 
applicable at national level?”, Jurisprudencija, Vol. 19, No. 4, 2012, pp.1269-1288, p. 
1270 (A. Rosas); Koen Lenaerts, ”Exploring the Limits of the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights”, European Constitutional Law Review, Vol. 8, No. 2, 2012, pp. 375-403, p. 377 (K. 
Lenaerts). 
103
 Articles 6(1) TEU and 52(7) Charter. See Explanations relating to the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights, [2007] OJ C303/717, (Explanations to the Charter). These are not 
laws, see Sionaidh Douglas-Scott, “The European Union and Human Rights after the 
Treaty of Lisbon”, Human Rights Law Review, Vol. 11, No. 4, 2011, pp. 645-682, p. 651 
(S. Doulgas-Scott). 
104
 Among cases establishing this principle, references in the explanation on Article 51(1) 
are made to the cases of C-5/88 Wachauf, judgement of the 13 July 1989, (Wachuaf), C-
260/89 ERT, judgement of the 18 June 1991 (ERT), and C-309/96 Annibaldi, judgement of 
the 18 December 1997.  
105
 A. Rosas p. 1276.  
106
 A. Rosas p. 1276; Xavier Groussot and others, “The Scope of Application of EU 
Fundamental Rights on Member States’ Action: In Search of Certainty in EU 
Adjudication”, Eric Stein Working Paper No 1/2011, p. 20 (X. Groussot and others); Steve 
Peers, “Immigration, Asylum and the European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights”, 
European Journal of Migration and Law, Vol. 3, No. 2, 2001, pp. 141-169, p. 145 (S. 
Peers). 
107
 Maria Teresa Gil-Bazo, “The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 
and the Right to be granted asylum in the Union’s Law”, Refugee Survey Quarterly, Vol. 
27, No. 3, UNHCR 2008, pp. 33-52, p. 36, (M. T. Gil-Bazo). 
 24 
Charter remain attached to the competences of the Union as already 
established by TEU and TFEU.
108
 Several authors have on the basis of 
Article 51(1) in the Charter and related case law from the CJEU identified 
the main categories of situations in which Member States are implementing 
Union law and consequently may be subjected to review by the Court in the 
context of their obligation to respect fundamental rights as guaranteed in the 
Union. Although these categories may be described in slightly different 
ways, two broad categories are referred to here. The first category concerns 
Member States when they “implement or apply” Union law and the second 
one encompass situations where Member States “derogate” from Union 
law.
109
 Measures constituting “implementation” have been summarised as 
including the application of EU secondary legislation, as well as the 
interpretation and enforcement thereof.
110
 Stated differently, Member States 
seem to be bound by fundamental rights whenever they act in order to “[…] 
fulfil their obligations under the treaties as well as under secondary EU 
law”.111 The derogation situations have basically been interpreted to cover 
situations where Member States act in another way than the one prescribed 
by EU provisions and Member States must accordingly ensure that the 
derogation is in line with fundamental rights.
112
 Rosas describes in summary 
that application of the Charter requires that national actions involve a 
connection between a EU provision and a right or freedom in the Charter.
113
  
 
More recent case law from the CJEU shows that the question on whether a 
national measure falls within the scope of Union law remains a rather 
complex issue. The judgement in Åklagaren v Hans Åkerberg Fransson can 
be illustrative for this matter.
114
 The case concerned in essence whether the 
principle of ne bis in idem in Article 50 of the Charter precluded a penalty to 
pay surcharge and a subsequent indictment from the Public Prosecutor on 
the basis of a single incident.
115
 The substance of the ruling is not of 
particular relevance here. Instead attention should be brought to the Court’s 
discussion on whether it had jurisdiction over the main proceedings since 
the principle of ne bis in idem in the Charter would only apply once it was 
established that the tax penalty and the criminal charge were 
implementations of Union law in accordance with Article 51(1) of the 
Charter. The Court recognised that the penalties partly concerned 
Åkerberg’s failure to report value added tax, for which the Member States 
are obliged by a directive and primary EU law to ensure through “legislative 
and administrative measures”.116 The Swedish government argued that the 
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national laws, allowing for these penalties, were not adopted because of this 
directive and could therefore not constitute implementation of Union law.
117
 
The Court however came to the opposite conclusion by relying on the 
connection between the purpose of the penalties and the more 
comprehensive obligation in Union law to protect “the financial interest of 
the Union”. Even if the national legislation was not adopted in order to 
incorporate the directive, it was used to counter violations of that directive 
and in a larger context, to protect the Union’s financial interests.118  
 
Åkerberg is an example where Union law does not regulate all measures 
taken by Member States in a certain field of law. In a situation like this, 
these measures may nevertheless by regarded as implementation of Union 
law and national rules or actions may therefore cause national courts to 
assess the legality of those rules or measures in relation to the Charter.
119
 
During such an assessment, the recent case of Melloni shows that it might 
be difficult for a national court to deal with rules on how to interpret the 
articles in the Charter.
120
 Article 53 in the Charter states that ”[nothing] in 
the Charter shall be interpreted as restricting or adversely affecting human 
rights and fundamental freedoms as recognised, [inter alia] by the Member 
States’ constitutions”. In Melloni, the Court was asked whether Article 53 
could be interpreted as preventing the Member State from carrying out a 
measure imposed by EU law when the measure would be contrary to the 
protection of individuals in their national constitution.
121
 The Court held that 
when Member States implement Union law within the meaning of the 
Charter, they may only rely on their national norms in so far as the “[…] 
level of protection provided for by the Charter, as interpreted by the Court, 
and the primacy, unity and effectiveness of EU law are not thereby 
compromised”.122 
 
Member States’ actions under the Dublin II Regulation should according to 
the above be assessed pursuant to these general guidelines on the 
applicability of the Charter. While the application of the Dublin rules seems 
rather easy to identify with regard to explicit references to the criteria set out 
in the regulation, the case of N.S. shows that it might not always be true. In 
N.S., the request for a preliminary ruling included a question of referral on 
whether a Member State’s decision to take over the responsibility based on 
Article 3(2) in the regulation could be seen as a measure of implementing 
Union law on the basis of either Article 6 TEU or Article 51(1) of the 
Charter or by both provisions.
123
 As seen by the observations made by 
international organisations and other Member States, there were arguments 
put forward both for an affirmative and a negative answer to this 
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question.
124
 For several reasons, the Court held in the end that such a 
decision in fact fell under the scope of Article 51(1) in the Charter. From the 
Court’s reply it can be said that the freedom granted to Member States in 
Article 3(2) in the regulation is based in EU primary law since the article is 
part of the CEAS framework.
125
 More explicitly, the Court considered the 
discretion as one of many mechanisms under the Dublin II Regulation for 
appointing a responsible Member State and the consequences of being 
responsible are the same as they would be in cases where other mechanisms 
are used. The exercise of Article 3(2) must therefore be considered to be an 
implementation of EU law.
126
 Adding to the general guidelines above, the 
N.S. judgement established that Member States are equally bound by the 
obligation to respect fundamental rights in the Charter when the 
implementation of EU law allows Member States to take decisions that are 
more sovereign.
127
  
 
From the foregoing discussions, it is possibly to draw some conclusions. 
Evidenced by recent cases in the CJEU, the scope of the Charter is not 
entirely clear and national courts will probably be facing difficulties when 
they decide whether or not Member State actions falls within the scope of 
Union law. The notion of implementing Union law has assumingly not yet 
been interpreted in every possible aspect and preliminary rulings subsequent 
to the case of N.S. envisage that this issue is very much alive. However, the 
Court’s conclusion concerning its jurisdiction in Åkerberg, particularly with 
regard to the fact that the national courts did not act under the impression 
that they were enforcing the rules in the Union directive, might suggest that 
the Court established a rather generous interpretation of concept of 
implementing Union law.  
 
  Provisions in the Charter relating to 4.1.1
asylum seekers  
The purpose of this section is to briefly distinguish the substance of the 
prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in 
Article 4, the rights to an effective remedy in Article 47, the right to asylum 
in Article 18 and the principle of the child’s best interest in Article 24 in the 
Charter and how these rights should be interpreted in relation to Member 
States responsibilities under the Dublin II Regulation. The general 
requirements covered by each one of the articles will therefore be 
commented in a limited way. 
 
Besides the rules on the scope of application of the Charter, there are rules 
on how to interpret the articles in the Charter. The most essential rule of 
interpretation here is Article 52(3) in the Charter. It establishes that when 
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rights in the Charter correspond to those in the ECHR, the provisions in the 
Charter shall have the same meaning and scope as the ones in the ECHR. 
Secondly, paragraph 3 in the article ascertains that the Union is free to 
afford higher protective standards than the ECHR. It is therefore inevitable 
to discuss the scope and meaning of some of the selected rights without 
parallel references to the jurisprudence of the ECtHR.
128
  
 
4.1.1.1  The prohibition of torture and inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment 
Article 4 in the Charter read as follows: “[no] one shall be subjected to 
torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment”. In the 
explanation on Article 4 it is stated that the right corresponds to Article 3 in 
the ECHR and consequently has the same meaning and scope as the 
provision in the ECHR.
129
  Besides the judgement in N.S. there are no cases 
available on the interpretation of Article 4 in the Charter in relation to the 
Dublin II Regulation. Discussion of the ECtHR on Article 3 in the ECHR is 
however a common element in cases involving asylum seekers.
130
  
 
It has already been stated that other provisions than Article 33 in the Geneva 
Convention relating to the status of refugees integrate the prohibition 
against non-refoulement. Where an individual would risk being exposed to 
refoulement, the ECtHR has incorporated the principle of non-refoulement 
into Article 3 in the ECHR when such an action would result in a breach of 
the rights in the same article.
131
 The ECtHR held in Soering that the absence 
of an explicit prohibition against refoulement does not mean that such a 
prohibition does not fall under the scope of Article 3 in the ECHR. Article 3 
creates an obligation not to remove a person “[…] where there are 
substantial grounds for believing that [the person] would be exposed to 
torture” as well as when there is a risk of being exposed to “inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment”.132 Article 3 ECHR covers in the same 
way situations where an individual may be subjected to indirect 
refoulement.
133
 Due to the fact that circumstances vary in each individual 
case, Article 3 ECHR has been held to become applicable when the 
treatment or punishment in question reaches the requirement of “minimum 
severity”.134 
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With reference to the reasoning of the CJEU in N.S., infringements of the 
rights in the Charter in a receiving Member State have to reach a certain 
level before they may have an actual impact on the sending Member State’s 
decision to transfer an asylum seeker on the basis of the regulation. Article 4 
should be interpreted as prohibiting the transfer when the Member State 
“[…] cannot be unaware that systematic deficiencies in the asylum 
procedure and in the reception conditions of asylum seekers in the 
[receiving] Member State amount to substantial grounds for believing that 
the asylum seeker would face a real risk of being subjected to inhuman or 
degrading treatment within the meaning of that provision”.135 When CJEU 
delivered the judgement, the Court relied on the reasoning in M.S.S. by the 
ECtHR. The ECtHR has recently confirmed its interpretation of Article 3 
ECHR in M.S.S. in the case of Mohammed Hussein and Others v. the 
Netherlands and Italy.
136
 The applicants in the main proceedings invoked 
Article 3 in order to challenge the transfer from the Netherlands to Italy. As 
claimed by the applicants, there were insufficient reception conditions for 
asylum seekers in Italy and there was allegedly a risk that the Italian 
authorities would send them back to their country of origin without an 
adequate asylum examination.
137
 Even though the Court did not find the 
applicants to have a legitimate claim against the Netherlands under Article 3 
ECHR, it compared the present situation with the circumstances in M.S.S. 
and retreated the extension of the protection afforded under the article for 
asylum seekers subjected to a transfer under the Dublin II Regulation.
138
 
Considering the way in which ECtHR has developed its reasoning on 
Article 3 ECHR in relation to Member States’ responsibilities in the 
reviewed cases involving the Dublin II Regulation, the CJEU has so far 
applied a similar interpretation in relation to Article 4 of the Charter. Along 
with the descriptions in M.S.S., there are therefore also guidelines for 
assessing whether lack of sufficient guarantees in a Member State’s asylum 
procedure and reception conditions amounts to systematic differences in the 
context of Article 4 in the Charter.
139
 Article 4 in the Charter may therefore 
constitute an example where the content and impact of the article in relation 
to the Dublin II Regulation is relatively clear at the moment.  
 
4.1.1.2  The right to an effective remedy  
Article 47 in the Charter includes both the right to an effective remedy and 
the right to a fair trial. In Article 47, it is stated that: “(1) Everyone whose 
rights and freedoms guaranteed by the law of the Union are violated has the 
right to an effective remedy before a tribunal in compliance with the 
conditions laid down in this Article. (2) Everyone is entitled to a fair and 
public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial 
tribunal previously established by law. Everyone shall have the possibility 
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of being advised, defended and represented. (3) Legal aid shall be made 
available to those who lack sufficient resources in so far as such aid is 
necessary to ensure effective access to justice”. The explanation on Article 
47 reveals that the scope and meaning of Article 47(1) “is based on” the 
right to an effective remedy in Article 13 ECHR whereas paragraph 2 and 3 
in Article 47 correspond to the right to a fair trial as stated in Article 6(1) 
ECHR.
140
 The explanations describe differences arising between the 
protection according to Union law and the ECHR. First of all, the Union has 
a more comprehensive protection due to the inclusion of the right to stand 
by a court. In comparison, the protection in ECHR covers the right to stand 
before “a national authority.”141 Another difference between the Charter and 
the ECHR in this regard is the fact that the right to a fair trial in Article 
47(2) is not restricted to criminal and civil matters.
142
 The Explanations to 
the Charter finally states that individuals may invoke Article 47 whenever 
Member States’ implementation of Union law violates a right guaranteed in 
the Union. Whether the violated right is placed in primary or secondary 
Union law is without relevance for the purpose of Article 47.
143
 Against 
these primary observations, it is clear that this article in the Charter 
encompasses several rights and there are more references to ECHR than 
under Article 4 of the Charter. All together, these factors suggest that Article 
47 can be reviewed from a wide range of aspects, including the objectives as 
set out in this section. In order to narrow down the scope of examination, 
paragraph 1 of the article will be prioritised.  
 
The right to an effective remedy in Article 47(1) in the Charter has not yet 
been interpreted in the context of the Dublin II Regulation. Similar to 
Article 4 in the Charter, it is therefore helpful to examine the case law from 
the ECtHR on Article 13 in the ECHR.
144
 In M.S.S., the ECtHR confirmed 
its previous case law on the issue of effective remedies in cases involving 
the risk of direct or indirect refoulement by sending asylum seekers back to 
the place where he or she allegedly will suffer from ill-treatment. From the 
case law it follows that Article 13 in the ECHR imposes an obligation for 
states to adopt national rules, which in practice grants asylum seekers the 
right to have a potential violation of a conventional right effectively 
reviewed by a competent body.
145
 This means for example that individuals 
should have a fair chance of getting access to a review.
146
 In the light of the 
effectiveness requirement, the ECtHR has also stated that in cases 
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concerning the risk of violation of Article 3 in the ECHR when an asylum 
seeker is to be expelled, there has to be a remedy available in the national 
legal order with “automatic suspensive effect”.147  
 
Whereas it can be seen in the case law referred to in this essay that both a 
transferring and a receiving Member State may have different legal 
remedies available for asylum seekers, they are nevertheless equally bound 
by the obligation in Article 47 of the Charter to offer asylum seekers 
effective remedies
148
 once there has been a violation of fundamental right 
protected in the Union. Against the purpose of determining the responsible 
Member State for processing an asylum application in the Union as 
explained in the first chapter, the need for further interpretation of Article 47 
in the Charter does not necessarily relate to the requirements within the 
article. This resembles the comments made under Article 4 of the Charter. 
More importantly, the judgement in N.S. makes it difficult to tell whether 
Article 47 alone would have an impact on Member States’ responsibilities 
under the Dublin II Regulation when it comes to assessing the legality of a 
transfer of an asylum seeker to the responsible Member State.  The CJEU 
has so far not discussed whether the risk of a violation of other rights than 
Article 4 in the Charter would be enough to suspend a transfer.
149
 
 
4.1.1.3  The right to asylum 
Due to the title of the article and the scope of application of the Dublin II 
Regulation, attention instantly falls to the right to asylum in Article 18 of 
the Charter. This article ensures that “[the] right to asylum shall be 
guaranteed with due respect for the rules of the Geneva Convention […] 
relating to the status of refugees and in accordance with the [TEU] and the 
[TFEU]”. In recital 15 of the Dublin II Regulation it is said that the 
regulation specifically “[…] seeks to ensure full observance of the right to 
asylum guaranteed by Article 18”. There are no further indications in the 
regulation or in the Charter on the scope and meaning of the right to asylum. 
The explanations to Article 18 specifies that the wording of the article is a 
result of the Union’s obligation in Article 78 TFEU to follow the rules in the 
Geneva Convention relating to the status of refugees whenever they legislate 
in the field of asylum.
150
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There seems to be no cases available in which the CJEU effectively deals 
with the substance of the right to asylum in the Charter.
151
 The questions 
referred to the Court in N.S. brought the scope and meaning of Article 18 in 
the Charter under the Dublin II Regulation briefly into question. As 
previously explained, the applicants argued for the United Kingdom to 
apply Article 3(2) in the Dublin II Regulation since they claimed that the 
transfer to the other states would infringe, inter alia, Article 18 in the 
Charter.
152
 The Court, however, did only respond to the questions resulting 
from this argument with reference to the prohibition of torture and inhuman 
or degrading treatment in Article 4 of the Charter and did not further define 
the scope and content of the other articles since there were no reasons to 
believe that Articles 1, 18, 19(2) and 47 in the Charter could bring the Court 
to a different conclusion than the one reached under Article 4.
153
  
 
It is therefore necessary to examining arguments submitted outside the 
sphere of the CJEU. Gil-Bazo has identified issues surrounding the scope 
and meaning of Article 18 in the Charter. Among them, she believes that it 
is particularly noticeable that the wording of the article does not reveal who 
should be granted asylum. Seen in the light of a tradition for states to decide 
on the basis of their sovereignty whether or not to entitle individuals to 
protection on their territory, she poses the question of whether Article 18 
confirms this right for Member States or if the article is meant to be relied 
on by individuals in order to be granted asylum, without necessary 
excluding the first one.
154
 In support for the latter interpretation, Gil-Bazo 
makes for example references to the preamble of the Charter, which 
allegedly verifies the status of the Charter as a collection of rights for 
individuals instead of rights of Member States.
155
 In addition, she further 
considers the complete absence of any articles in the Charter concerning 
rights for the Member States as an indication for an interpretation in the 
suggested direction. In case such an individual right is recognised, issues 
surrounding the material and personal scope of Article 18 remain.
156
 Peers 
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states that the right to asylum in Article 18 has a broader scope than the 
Article 14(1) in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which ensures 
that “[everyone] has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum 
from persecution”.157 Article 14(1) in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights will not be further analysed. 
 
It is relevant to highlight the fact that there is currently a case pending 
before the CJEU, which involves relevant questions for this essay, including 
the interpretation of Article 18 in the Charter.
158
 The national courts of 
Bulgaria has asked the Court to provide for an interpretation of the content 
of Article 18 in conjunction with Article 53 in the Charter, Article 2(c) and 
recital 12 of the Dublin II Regulation.
159
 For this reason, UNHCR recently 
published a statement on how the right to asylum allegedly applies in 
international and European contexts.
160
 When it comes to the European 
version of the right to asylum, UNHCR states that it follows from the 
explanation on Article 18 in the Charter that the article imposes two 
obligations on the Union. The Union must respect the rules in the Geneva 
Convention relating to the status of refugees, and it must comply with the 
obligations set out in Articles 78 and 80 TFEU.
161
 Whereas the significance 
of the Geneva Convention relating to the status of refugees in European 
asylum law and the content of Article 78 TFEU have been explained in the 
above, Article 80 TEU obliges the Member States to establish cooperation 
based on solidarity and equal responsibilities.
162
 According to UNHCR, it is 
evident that the Dublin II Regulation and the CEAS directives cover the 
objective of enforcing the right to asylum in Article 18 in the Charter.
163
  In 
order to determine the scope and meaning of Article 18 in the Charter, 
UNHCR then appears to combine a reading of Article 18, Articles 78 and 80 
TFEU, together with the rules in the Dublin II Regulation and the CEAS 
directives.
164
  Against these articles, the UNHCR identifies a list of rights of 
individual asylum seekers as well as obligations for Member States covered 
by Article 18 in the Charter. For example, UNHCR maintains that Article 
3(1) in the Dublin II Regulation and Articles 13 and 18 in the directive on 
minimum standards for the qualification and status of third country 
nationals
165
 result in “an obligation on Member States to ensure, inter alia, 
that an asylum seeker (i) has access to and can enjoy a fair and efficient 
examination of his or her claim and/or an effective remedy in the receiving 
states, (ii) is treated in accordance with adequate reception conditions, and 
(iii) is granted asylum in the form of refugee status when the criteria are 
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met”.166 It is not necessary to present the complete list of rights and 
obligations included in Article 18 in the Charter. It is however noticeable 
that Article 18 is found by UNHCR to comprehend more rights than just the 
right of asylum seekers not to be subjected to refoulement. Due to this 
extensive scope of protection, UNHCR explains that Article 18 therefore 
coincides with Articles 1, 4, 19(2) and 47 in the Charter.
167
 
 
Regardless of the Court’s reasoning in N.S., there will be opportunities in 
the future to develop Article 18 in the Charter into a more concrete right, 
which potentially can be invoked by individuals in order to avoid being 
transferred.
168
 AG Trstenjak argued for example in a different way than the 
Court. She meant that extreme pressure on a national asylum system would, 
not necessarily in addition to the risk of violating other rights in the Charter, 
call upon the sending Member State to assess the legality of its decision to 
transfer an asylum seeker in the light of Article 18.
169
 By virtue of the 
connection between the principle of non-refoulement in Article 33 of the 
Geneva Convention relating to the status of refugees and Article 18, AG 
Trsenjak submitted that whenever a transfer from a Member State to another 
Member State could expose an asylum seeker either to direct or indirect 
refoulement it would be contrary to Article 18 in the Charter.
170
   
 
Without preliminary rulings from the CJEU, it is not possible for sure to 
determine whether the right to asylum in the Charter is to be interpreted in 
accordance with one or more of the suggested interpretations above. It 
appears to be relatively poor guidelines on how to approach the article in 
comparison to the number of questions raised with regard to the scope and 
meaning of Article 18 in the Charter. Common in the foregoing statements 
is nevertheless the urge for a wide interpretation of the protection 
guaranteed by the right to asylum. It is however not possible at this stage to 
see in what ways Article 18 in the Charter specifically means when Member 
States apply the Dublin II Regulation. 
 
4.1.1.4  The principle of the child’s best interest 
As partly described before, the rules in the Dublin II Regulation intend to be 
less intrusive for more vulnerable categories of asylum seekers. The group 
of unaccompanied minors is one of the categories.
171
 Article 24 in the 
Charter obliges Member States to protect the rights of the child whenever 
they implement Union law.
172
 Accordingly, “(1) Children shall have the 
right to such protection and care as is necessary for their well-being. They 
may express their views freely. Such views shall be taken into consideration 
                                                 
166
 Ibid. p. 8. For the complete list of  ”elements”  in Article 18 Charter, see pp. 8-9.  
167
 Ibid. p. 8. 
168
 Cathryn Costello in n. 57 above, p. 88, and in “Courting Access to Asylum in Europe: 
Recent Supranational Jurisprudence Explored, Human Rights Law Review, Vol. 12, No. 2, 
2012, pp. 287-339, p. 308. 
169
 Opinion in N.S. para. 111-113. 
170
 Ibid. 114 -115. 
171
 S. Peers and N. Rogers p. 222. 
172
 Articles 24 and 51(1) Charter. 
 34 
on matters which concern them in accordance with their age and maturity. 
(2) In all actions relating to children, whether taken by public authorities or 
private institutions, the child’s best interests must be a primary 
consideration. (3) Every child shall have the right to maintain on a regular 
basis a personal relationship and direct contact with both his or her parents, 
unless that is contrary to his or her interests.” It follows from the 
Explanations to the Charter that Article 24 draws inspiration from the 
provisions in the New York Convention on the Rights of the Child.
173
  
 
Similar to the right to asylum in Article 18 in the Charter, there is no right in 
the ECHR corresponding to the rights of the child in Article 24 in the 
Charter. Even though Article 24 has been brought into cases of immigration 
issues, such as the case of Gerardo Ruiz Zambrano v. Office national de 
lémploi, there are so far no judgements from the CJEU on the interpretation 
of Article 24 in relation to the Dublin II Regulation.
174
 The inclusion of 
Article 24 in this essay is motivated by the fact that the Court of Appeal in 
the United Kingdom is currently awaiting answers to questions made in a 
request for a preliminary ruling in the case of MA and others v. Secretary of 
State for the Home Department on Article 6(2) Dublin II Regulation in 
relation to Article 24(2) in the Charter.
175
 These questions arose in the 
proceedings of determining the responsibility for processing asylum 
applications lodged in the Union by three minors from third-countries.
176
 
Although the joint case is currently pending, AG Cruz Villalón recently 
delivered his opinion on the case.
177
 
 
When the courts in the United Kingdom determined the Member State 
responsible, they applied Article 6 of the Dublin II Regulation since the 
applicants in the pending case are unaccompanied minors.
178
 Recalling the 
requirements for applying Article 6 in the regulation as stated in chapter 2, 
this case presents rather unique circumstances since none of the 
unaccompanied minors have family members legally present in the Union 
and they have all applied for asylum in another Member State before they 
lodged their asylum applications in the United Kingdom.
179
 At the outset, 
the issues in the main proceedings partly fall out of the scope of Article 6 as 
well as the regulation as a whole.
180
 CJEU will accordingly have to address 
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to the responsibility issue.
181
Despite the absence of any reference to the 
principle of the best interest of the child in Article 6(2), the Court is further 
requested to decide whether this principle still would be of main importance 
in cases where Article 6(2) in the regulation is applied.
182
 Judged from the 
arguments submitted by governments in some Member States, Article 6(2) 
in the regulation must be interpreted in a way where either the location of 
the minors’ first or latest application will be of most importance for the 
responsibility issue.
183
 AG Cruz Villalón explains that it is not merely a 
question of identifying a responsibly Member State, but also a question of 
deciding which one of the Member States involved should be the one to 
identify the responsible Member State.
184
 There are thus two decisions to be 
made. AG Cruz Villalón believes that an interpretation of Article 6(2) in the 
regulation alone will not solve the issues at stake.
185
 In a simplified way, 
AG Cruz Villalón submits that a combined reading of Article 6 in the 
regulation and Article 24(2) in the Charter results in a solution where the 
child’s best interest should be decisive in both decisions.186 This further 
indicates that the Member State in which the minor most recently applied 
for asylum should be the one to appoint the responsible Member State in the 
end. Usually, this is where the minor resides at the moment and these 
authorities would arguably have a better chance to observe the best interest 
of the minor in question.
187
  
 
Worth mentioning, as claimed by some of the governments and 
acknowledged by AG Cruz Villalón, is the fact that this recommended 
solution might cause the Dublin II Regulation to be less effective than it is 
intended to be.
188
 As stated in the above, the regulation has entered into 
force with the aim if providing the Union with a “clear, [rapid] and 
workable method” for establishing the responsible Member State.189  In a 
potential conflict between the objectives of the regulation and the concern 
for the child’s best interest, AG Cruz Villalón assumes that concerns for the 
latter will prevail.
190
 Similar to other cases, the CJEU might therefore be 
confronted with a case in which the Court potentially has to strike a fair 
balance between the reasons for effectiveness and concerns for a 
fundamental right in the Charter. If the “child’s best interest” is decisive in 
all different scenarios arising from the Dublin II Regulation, the protection 
of unaccompanied minors would accordingly be preserved in all situations. 
This should be welcomed from a fundamental rights perspective. When it 
comes to the perspective of the Member States, the most apparent 
consequence would assumingly be the creation of a more demanding 
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procedure for establishing the responsible Member State in cases of 
unaccompanied minors than there is for other categories of asylum seekers 
under the regulation. Another complexity could further arise if an 
unaccompanied minor applies for asylum in more than two Member States 
under the same circumstances as in the present case since the potential 
number of Member States responsible would increase. In such a situation it 
could be difficult for Member States to rapidly assess the meaning of the 
child’s best interest both with regard to the Member State which should 
determine the responsible Member State and with respect to the decision of 
a responsible Member State. However, it remains to be seen to what extent 
Article 24 in the Charter will influence the Court’s interpretation of Article 
6 in the regulation. 
 
In summary, when comparing Articles 4, 47, 18 and 24 in the Charter, these 
sections illustrated that the scope, content and interpretation may be more 
difficult to establish with respect to some of the reviewed articles. At this 
present stage, there are still remaining questions on their impact on the 
regulation. It is thus clear that the determination of the responsibilities of 
Member States in their application of the Dublin II Regulation is dependent 
on future interpretations of these articles by the Court. The review of the 
upcoming preliminary ruling in the case of MA on the interpretation of the 
principle of the child’s best interest was partly brought into this examination 
with regard to the latter perspective. Besides individual questions on the 
interpretation of some of these fundamental rights, the judgement in N.S. 
also raised the issue on the internal relationship between Articles 4, 18 and 
19(2) in the Charter. Article 19(2) protects individuals from the risk of death 
penalty, torture or any other kind of inhuman treatment specifically in cases 
of removal, expulsion or extradition. There is currently no case law 
available from the CJEU on how to interpret this article. In the Explanations 
to the Charter the article is described as a direct result of the principles 
established by the ECtHR on the basis of Article 3 ECHR in the cases of 
Ahmed v Austria and Soering.
191
 Peers recognised the unsettled status of 
Article 19(2) already before the Charter became binding and submitted that 
the rules of interpretation in the Charter make it plausible to suggest that the 
introduction of Article 19(2) was solely an example on how to clarify rights 
less evident than others.
192
 Peers further observed that the prohibition of 
refoulement is common to all three articles.
193
 Recalling the statement by 
the UNHCR on the right to asylum in Article 18, similar observations have 
been made. However, there is assumingly still a need to clarify the 
relationship between these rights in order to understand their potential 
impact on Member States’ responsibilities, in particular when it comes to 
transfer asylum seekers on the basis of the Dublin II Regulation. 
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4.2  The relationship between Union law 
and the ECHR 
From the foregoing sections, it becomes clear that there is a genuine link 
between the Charter and the ECHR. It is thus a relevant factor to consider 
when the Member States’ responsibilities are examined from the perspective 
of fundamental rights. The final two sections in this essay will therefore 
address some of the aspects of this relationship.  
 
  The rule of interpretation in Article 52(3) 4.2.1
of the Charter 
Article 52(3) in the Charter contains two different rules. They overlap with 
each other and will therefore be treated closely together. As earlier 
specified, the rule of interpretation in Article 52(3) establishes that “[in] so 
far as the Charter contains rights which correspond to rights guaranteed by 
the ECHR, the meaning and scope of those rights shall be the same as those 
laid down by the said Convention”. This article also guarantees that the 
Union may always be free to apply a more extensive protection than the 
corresponding right in ECHR. Concerning the latter factor, the Explanations 
to the Charter clarifies that the Union is prevented from imposing more 
restrictive scopes and contents to the rights in the Charter that correspond to 
the ones in the ECHR.
194
  These factors thus explain why the ECHR is 
described as minimum standards of protection for corresponding rights in 
the Charter.
195
 From the Explanations to the Charter it is said that paragraph 
3 of Article 52 was introduced in order to clarify the relationship between 
the rights in the Charter and in the ECHR. In more detail, the purpose of 
paragraph 3 in the article is to ensure that the “autonomy of Union law” and 
the role of the CJEU as far as possibly remain intact.
196
 While the previous 
review of some of the rights in the Charter partly relied on Article 52(3), the 
overall objective of this essay makes it appropriate to further explore the 
meaning of this article.  
 
When it comes to the system of corresponding rights, it is rather easy to 
identify rights in the Charter that are consistent with articles in the ECHR. 
Annexed to the explanations under Article 52(3) there are lists specifying 
the rights concerned.
197
 These lists show that there are different ways in 
which rights in the Charter and the ECHR can correspond to each other. For 
example, there may be rights considered to have both the same scope and 
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meaning, or rights with the same meaning but where the Charter right has a 
wider scope than the one in the ECHR.
198
 Recalling the examination of the 
rights in the Charter above, the right to an effective remedy and to a fair trail 
in Article 47 in the Charter may constitute an illustrative example in this 
regard. These lists in the Explanations to the Charter are said to reflect the 
current status of the corresponding articles in the Charter and the ECHR, but 
they are open for amendments in consistency with the development of 
Union legislation.
199
 In comparison to existing corresponding rights, when 
there are articles in the Charter without counterparts in the ECHR, the CJEU 
is free to develop the meaning and scope of these articles without due 
account of the ECHR.
200
  Neither the right to asylum in Article 18 nor the 
rights of the child in Article 24 of the Charter have corresponding rights in 
the ECHR. Based on the review on right to asylum in Article 18 and the 
principle of the child’s best interest in Article 24 above, this seems to be a 
reason for why it appears to be more difficult to identify the scope and 
content as well as the impact of non-corresponding rights in the Charter. 
Yet, these rights exist in the Charter and they may therefore be developed 
without influences from the ECHR.  
 
From a comprehensive view, the question thus arises whether there are any 
practical implications originating from Article 52(3) in the Charter that may 
have an impact on Member States’ responsibilities from a fundamental 
rights perspective. If possible, conclusions under this section will be drawn 
in the light of the Dublin II Regulation. In the search for implications from 
the rules established by Article 52(3), questions regarding the system of 
corresponding rights can be identified in the academic literature. By 
recognising the ECHR as minimum standards of protection for rights 
corresponding in the Charter and in the ECHR, Lock raises the question 
whether it is actually mandatory to rely on the jurisprudence of ECtHR 
when the corresponding rights in the Charter are being interpreted.
201
 Lock 
argues against the existence of such an obligation. In support for his 
argumentation he appears to be mostly concerned with the potential effect 
on the independency of the Union legal order.
202
 He poses a scenario where 
the CJEU always would be obliged to follow the interpretation of the 
corresponding articles in the ECHR and thereby be subject to the 
judgements of the ECtHR.
203
 Lock nevertheless seems to believe that the 
jurisprudence of ECtHR on articles in the ECHR corresponding to the 
Charter is of major importance along with other sources of interpretation.
204
 
It is important to remember that the interpretation of the articles in the 
Charter is constantly in progress. Subsequent to the arguments submitted by 
Lock, there have been new judgements from the CJEU concerning Article 
52(3) and corresponding rights. Other authors have for example included the 
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case J McB v LE in their discussions on the meaning of Article 52(3) and the 
potential binding nature of ECtHR’s jurisprudence.205 In J MvB, the 
question referred to the Court for a preliminary ruling involved the 
interpretation of the right to respect for private and family life in Article 7 in 
the Charter.
206
 Accordingly, the Court reiterated the wording of Article 
52(3) and stated that Article 7 in the Charter corresponds to Article 8(1) in 
the ECHR. Citing the Court in this judgement, “Article 7 of the Charter 
must therefore be given the same meaning and the same scope as Article 
8(1) of the ECHR, as interpreted by the case-law of the European Court of 
Human Rights”.207  The low number of cases from the CJEU on the 
interpretation of the corresponding rights covered by Articles 4 and 47 in 
the Charter in the context of the Dublin II Regulation may probably be 
reason enough not to engage in a comparative study on whether or not the 
CJEU follows or would follow the exact same line of reasoning as the 
ECtHR. It has already been stated that the CJEU and the ECtHR came to 
similar conclusions in the cases of N.S. and M.S.S. with respect to Article 4 
in the Charter and Article 3 in the ECHR respectively. This is also an 
explanation to why this examination not includes a comparison on the same 
articles in another context than the Dublin II Regulation. Against this 
background and with these limitations, it seems though like the status of the 
jurisprudence of ECtHR is preferably strong when corresponding rights in 
the Charter are interpreted.  
 
However, this primary conclusion becomes vague in the light of some of the 
recent rulings from the CJEU in which the Court has dealt with 
corresponding rights in the Charter. Even if the following cases concern 
issues outside the scope of application of the Dublin II Regulation, they may 
be used for the purpose of showing how the Court most recently has 
approached the interpretation corresponding rights. The previous mention 
case of Åkerberg concerned the compatibility with the principle of ne bis in 
idem in Article 50 in the Charter and in Article 4 Protocol 7 in the ECHR of 
a tax penalty and a subsequent criminal charge imposed by the national 
courts due to one a single offence committed by Åkerberg.
208
 Opposed to 
the provision in the ECHR, the principle of ne bis in idem in Article 50 in 
the Charter “[…] applies not only within the jurisdiction of one State but 
also between the jurisdiction of several Member States”.209 This means that 
the articles in the Charter and in the ECHR on the principle of ne bis in idem 
correspond to each other when the principle is challenged in one single 
Member State and the interpretation of Article 50 in the Charter will 
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accordingly be guided by the jurisprudence of the ECtHR.
210
 The situation 
in Åkerberg thus concerned the issue of interpreting the principle of ne bis 
in idem in an “internal situation” since the Swedish courts alone imposed 
the penalties.
211
 However, when the Court in Åkerberg elaborated on the 
scope of Article 50 in the Charter and specified the criteria used for 
determining whether the present situation was in violation with the article it 
did not refer to the case law of the ECtHR concerning the principle of ne bis 
in idem. Instead, the Court kept its reasoning in line with its previous 
jurisprudence.
212
 In contrast, when the Court was asked in the case of 
Melloni to interpret the corresponding rights to an effective remedy and to a 
fair trial in Article 47, and the corresponding rights of the defence in Article 
48(2) in the Charter, parallels to the jurisprudence of the ECtHR on Articles 
6(1) and (3) in the ECHR were made.
213
 Against these recent judgements 
from the CJEU, it is therefore difficult to establish the status of the 
jurisprudence of the ECtHR with regard to corresponding rights in the 
Charter and in the ECHR. The fact that a case before the CJEU involves an 
interpretation of a right in the Charter corresponding to an article in the 
ECHR does not seem to imply that the CJEU necessarily relies on 
guidelines in the case law of ECtHR.  
 
The question whether Article 52(3) as such causes practical implications in 
the determination of Member States responsibilities from a fundamental 
rights perspective is hard to tell. Likewise, the benefits of the article are 
questionable. It follows from the above that it might be easier to predict and 
to identify the scope and meaning of corresponding rights in the Charter 
than non-corresponding rights since there are more sources of interpretation 
available. Fundamental rights obligations of the Member States may 
consequently be easier to establish when it comes to corresponding rights. 
This seems particularly relevant in situations where there are limited 
numbers of judgements from the CJEU on rights in the Charter. However, 
since the status of the jurisprudence from the ECtHR appears to be 
unsettled, the scope and content of a corresponding right in the Charter 
cannot be fully established until the CJEU deliver an interpretation of the 
right in question. A similar conclusion should also be possible to draw from 
the fact that the Union is allowed to make the protection of a corresponding 
right more extensive than the provision in the ECHR. In the end, Article 
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52(3) does not appear to be of particular relevance in the determination of 
Member States’ responsibilities.    
 
  The status of the ECHR in the Union and 4.2.2
the future accession of the Union the 
ECHR 
The status of the ECHR was partly discussed in the previous section. One 
way of exploring the status of the ECHR in the Union’s legal order outside 
the framework of Article 52(3) in the Charter is to study Article 6 TEU. 
This article is held to be of importance once the general protection of 
fundamental rights in the Union is examined.
214
 Article 6(1) TEU was 
introduced in the beginning of chapter 4 since it establishes the new legal 
status of the Charter. The same article also describes how other sources of 
law, such as the ECHR, contribute to the general framework of fundamental 
rights protection in the Union.
215
 As stated in paragraph 3 in Article 6, 
“general principles of the Union’s law” steam from the articles in the ECHR 
and from “constitutional traditions common to the Member States”.216 More 
importantly, Article 6(2) TEU obliges the Union to accede to the ECHR. 
From the work of scholars, it becomes clear that status of the ECHR as well 
as the relationship between the ECHR and Union law will be affected by the 
future accession to of the Union.
217
 Besides the obligation of the Union to 
accede to the ECHR, Article 6(2) TEU states that the competences of the 
Union established in primary Union law shall not be modified by the 
accession. The main purpose here is to briefly present key factors describing 
the current relationship between Union law and the ECHR and some of the 
main reasons behind the accession. Common to some of the previous 
sections in this essay, this present objective will also be approached in broad 
context since the accession relates to Member States’ responsibilities from a 
fundamental rights perspective beyond the Dublin II Regulation. 
 
As seen from some of the reviewed judgements from the CJEU and the 
ECtHR and from observations made by authors in the academic literature, 
the two courts refer to each other’s case law in their own judgements 
concerning fundamental rights.
218
 With regard to Member States of the 
Union, another key factor on the relationship between Union law and the 
ECHR constitutes of the fact that the ECtHR sometimes rule on actions 
committed by Member States on the basis of Union law.
219
 The case of 
M.S.S. is one example since the violations of the rights in the ECHR 
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originated from actions of Union Member States made under the Dublin II 
Regulation.
220
 Even if it is possible to identify different approaches by the 
ECtHR in cases where Member States have acted on account of their Union 
obligations,
221
 the case of Bosphorus appears to be the most illustrative case 
in this regard.
222
 Without going into the details of the factual circumstances, 
the CJEU had to deal with the potential conflict between an act by a 
Member State on the basis of Union law and the right to peaceful enjoyment 
of property under Union law for an aircraft company.
223
 This case was also 
brought to the ECtHR by the aircraft company with reference to the respect 
for property rights in Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 ECHR.
224
  Provided that 
there is no discretionary power for Member States under a relevant 
provision in Union law, the ECtHR stated in the main proceedings that 
Member States acting on behalf of Union legislation may be regarded as 
complying with the ECHR when the Union can be presumed to protect 
fundamental rights in an “equivalent” way as the ECHR.225 The ECtHR 
further stated that violations of the ECHR under these circumstances only 
occur when the “[…] protection of [ECHR] rights was manifestly 
deficient”.226 It is important to observe that the presumption in Bosphorus 
thus apply only in certain situations.
227
 For example, it follows from the 
criteria established by the ECtHR that the presumption would probably not 
be applicable in a situation such as the one described in the case of N.S. 
since Member States enjoy discretion in their implementation of Article 3(2) 
in the Dublin II Regulation.  
 
In the light of these key factors, it is interesting to examining some of the 
main reasons behind the accession of the Union to the ECHR. When it 
comes to the Member States’ implementation of Union law, it is suggested 
that it might be difficult for Member States to comply with Union law and 
the ECHR concurrently in cases where the CJEU and the ECtHR approach 
fundamental rights in different ways.
 228
 The accession to the ECHR is 
consequently seen as an opportunity to regulate the relationship between the 
two courts and the issue of different interpretations of fundamental rights.
229
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Moreover, concerns for fundamental rights protection has increased in 
consistency with the developments of the competences of the Union.
230
 
Fundamental rights will therefore be protected more effectively since the 
Union will be required to respect the rights in the ECHR.
231
 Similar to other 
parties of the ECHR, actions by the institutions of the Union, including 
judgements from the CJEU, will be subjected to the jurisdiction of the 
ECtHR.
232
  In this respect, it seems relevant to briefly explore whether the 
ECtHR may be presumed to uphold its assumption that the Union protects 
fundamental rights in an equivalent way as the ECHR subsequent to the 
accession.
233
 Without denying potential consequences, scholars appear to be 
more or less of the belief that the ECtHR would be obliged to leave the 
Bosphorus presumption behind.
234
 As to the issues with the scope of 
application of the presumption, Eckes puts forward that the accession of the 
Union essentially will urge the ECtHR to determine whether the CJEU has 
delivered judgements in conformity with the ECHR in each specific case.
235
  
Lock also recognises that the scope of the presumption is limited and the 
maintenance of the presumption would therefore lead the ECtHR to exclude 
many cases concerning Union law from scrutiny.
236
 With regard to the 
concept of “equivalent” protection, it is further suggested that it would not 
be appropriate to assess compliance with the ECHR of the Union and the 
other parties to the ECHR on different premises.
237
  
 
With the exception to the comments on the Bosphorus ruling above, further 
discussion on potential complications and questions arising from the future 
accession, including the autonomy of the Union’s legal order, are excluded 
from this examination. There is however reason to expect that the general 
debate on the accession will be intensified in the near future since it has 
been reported that the members of the Council of Europe and the Union 
recently concluded the final draft of the accession agreement.
238
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5 Conclusions 
The purpose of this essay is to examine the responsibilities of the Member 
States in the European Union from a fundamental rights perspective in 
relation to the Dublin II Regulation. For this reason, the obligation for 
Member States to assess other Member States’ compliance with 
fundamental rights and the obligation of all Member States to respect 
fundamental rights in the Union have been examined. While the previous 
chapters dealt with the responsibilities of Member States in more detail, the 
purpose of this final section is to present general conclusions regarding 
these two main obligations. 
 
When it comes to the obligation for Member States to assess other Member 
States’ compliance with fundamental rights, it is clear that the CJEU 
recognised the presence of such an obligation under the Dublin II 
Regulation for the first time in the case of N.S. With inspiration form the 
ECtHR, the CJEU found that sending Member States are not allowed to rely 
on a conclusive presumption of safety when they transfer asylum seekers to 
the responsible Member State. However, this obligation has only been 
interpreted in relation to the prohibition of torture and ill-treatment in 
Article 4 of the Charter. Until the CJEU decides otherwise, this obligation is 
thus limited to duty of examining whether there is a substantial risk that the 
responsible Member State would treat an asylum seeker contrary to the 
rights in Article 4 of the Charter. If such a risk exists, the sending Member 
State is obliged to suspend the transfer of the asylum seeker to the 
responsible Member State.  
 
Likewise, there is an obligation for all Member States to respect 
fundamental rights when they apply the rules in the Dublin II Regulation. 
Nevertheless, the objective to establish the impact of the Charter and 
specific rights in the Charter on Member States’ responsibilities under the 
regulation becomes difficult due to several factors. Despite recent 
judgements from the CJEU, there are still remaining questions on the 
interpretation of the concept of implementing Union law in Article 51(1) of 
the Charter. Therefore, it might be difficult to establish whether the Charter 
is applicable to a certain situation in the first place. The review of the rights 
in the Charter is further challenged by the fact that there are currently 
limited numbers of judgements from the CJEU on how to interpret the scope 
and meaning of these rights. Even though the rule of interpretation in Article 
52(3) in the Charter facilitate the examination of corresponding rights in the 
Charter, since it urges the interpretation to be guided by the case law from 
the ECtHR, the scope and content of the articles in the Charter will not be 
fully clear until they been subjected to interpretation of the CJEU. Further 
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nal&BackColorInternet=F5CA75&BackColorIntranet=F5CA75&BackColorLogged=A9B
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preliminary rulings from the CJEU is also important with respect to the 
issue of combining the effectiveness of the regulation and the enforcement 
of fundamental rights of asylum seekers in the Charter. Finally, whereas the 
effects of the accession of the Union to the ECHR may be difficult to 
predict in its entirety, there is reason to assume that there will be a more 
comprehensive review of the protection of fundamental rights within the 
Union. The responsibilities of Member States may therefore be enhanced in 
fields of Union law, including their responsibilities under the Dublin II 
Regulation. 
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